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AND OBJECTIVE WORLD OF THE PRESCHOOL CHILD:
A NEW METHODOLOGY AND SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the division within symbolic
interactionism today into the Iowa and Chicago Schools.
Taking the position that the differences are potentially
reconcilable, the authors present a study which demonstrates
some methodological extensions of the positivistic Iowa
School in conjunction with some of the insights of Blumer's
phenomenological Chicago School. The research employed a
quasi-experimental design, the aim of which was to investigate
the relationship between cognitive organization of behavior
and conditions of age and educational program. Subjects
were 117 three and four year old children observed
naturalistically in three preschool programs: a Montessori
Class, a Parent-Child Center, and a Day Care Center.
Quantitative and qualitative measures were obtained through
the instrumentation termed the Direct Object Count and by
classifying the acts themselves. Via cross-sectional and
longitudinal analysis significant differences were found on
indices of age and educational program. The overall findings
suggest that race and class are not sufficient to explain
such differences. The authors conclude that a large part
of the behavior of preschool children is determined by the
children themselves who appear quite capable of organizing
their behavior in accordance with the objective and symbolic
conditions with which they are presented.
Both as a theory and a methodology, symbolic interaction-
ism stands second only to structural-functionalism in its
impact on sociologists. Yet, symbolic interactionism is
anything but a unified body of knowledge. There is a common
starting point inthe work of George Herbert Mead during the
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early 1920's. However, since the death of Mead, there has
been a substantial division within the work of symbolic inter-
actionists. Meltzer and Petras (1972) have noted that there
are two distinct schools of symbolic interactionism.
The Chicago School is associated with the perspective of
Herbert Blumer. Bluner (1969) has tended to emphasize the
more subjective and phenomenological aspect of Mead's work.
He sees man as essentially spontaneous, unpredictable and
free. Blumer places a great deal of weight on the importance
of the "I" in formulating behavior, the "I" being impulsive,
almost animalistic. The data gathering techniques of Blumer
are built around observing and understanding behavior rather
than predicting or controlling it. In contrast, the late
Manford Kuhn founded what has come to be called the Iowa
School of symbolic interactionism. In contrast to the neo-
idealist philosophy of Blumer, Kuhn (1964) was much more
methodologically and positivistically oriented. Kuhn believed
that Mead's work and concept had to be operationalized if
they were to have any utility. Kuhn essentially did away with
the implied dialectic between the "I" and "me" by eliminating
the former as unmeasurable. By concentrating on the "me",
Kuhn was attempting to measure the relatively stable aspects
of social behavior.
Thus, the Iowa School of symbolic interactionism has
tended to emphasize the objectivistic, positivistic element
of Mead's work. In keeping with this concern, Kuhn and
McPartland (1972) developed the TST, or Twenty Statements
Test, which is in essence a measure of objective social self.
It assumes that an individual is capable of articulatina
social self and that self is basically a reflection of role
taking behavior. In its simplest form, the TST is a hiqhly
reliable, easily scored testament ot Kuhn's belief in the
measurability of self.
There is no particular unifying methodological orientation
in the Chicago School. In fact, it would appear that adherents
of this orientation are presently drifting into a kind of
phenomenological perspective, as indicated by the recent work
of Goffman (1974), in particular, on Frame Analysis, and
Cicourel (1974) on Cognitive Sociology.
It is the contention of this paper that symbolic inter-
actionism, in particular the symbolic interactionism employed
in a kind of social welfare context, must push forward on
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charting the objective and measurable aspects of the social
environment. We feel that the kind of thinking that lead to
the development of the Twenty Statement Test can profitably
be extended to developmental aspects of childhood. However,
we also feel that the attempt to objectify should take into
account some of Blumer's contentions about the nature of the
symbolic act and the importance of language.
In particular, we propose some specific methodological
extensions of the Iowa School approach into the realm of the
symbolic environment of the child. This extension will be
facilitated by also incorporating some of the insights of
Herbert Blumer and the Chicago School. This methodology
involves an application of the Meadian distinction between
"play" and "game" and between significant and non-significant
symbols. We assume that classes of social acts can be
meaningfully charted and objectively measured.
Symbolic interactionism has until recently had little to
say about child development. It has essentially left this
area to developmental psychology and the corresponding emphasis
on intra-psychic change. Perhaps the reason for this failure
has been its inability to develop a parallel to the TST for
categorizing the social acts of children.
We believe such an instrument is now available. The rest
of this paper will illustrate how the use of two tools, the
Direct Object Count and second-order acts, can be utilized in
understanding the manner in which children interact with and
impose meaning on their social environment. We will report on
a research effort by one of the authors (Malon, 1975) which we
think demonstrates that greater specificity of concepts can be
achieved and objective measurement obtained without detracting
from the richness of Meadian theory. We hope that it will also
illustrate that it is possible to draw from the best of both
schools of symbolic interactionism in designing research which
has methodological and practical significance for a given
social problem area.
THE STUDY
The research involved the use of a quasi-experimental
design without random assignment of subjects to comparison
groups. Its purpose was to study the ways in which preschool
children organize their behavior. The subjects were 117
three and four year old children observed in the Fall of 1972,
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Spring of 1973 and again in the Spring of 1974. The subjects
were enrolled in three different types of preschool programs:
45 in a Montessori Class, 27 in a Parent-Child Center, and 45
in a Day Care Center. The children in the Montessori Class
(MC) were white and had parents relatively high in income and
education, while the children in the Parent-Child Center (PCC)
and Day Care Center (DC) were black and had oarents relatively
low in income and education. The educational programs also
differed in terms of the amount of learning structure and the
number of instructional objects present, with the MC having
the greatest amount of each. On the other hand, the PCC and
DC programs provided a greater amount of time in playful
interaction with people and play objects than did the Monte-
ssori Class. The MC and PCC subjects were observed at all
three time periods. The DC children could only be observed
at times 2 and 3.
The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship
between cognitive organization of behavior and two indices of
the conditions under which the behavior was organized: age
and educational program.
The research was guided by Mead's (1970: 77) dynamic
conception of human behavior in terms of acts which generate
objects and take on meaning during the process of interaction
with other persons and things. The concept of the organiza-
tion of behavior was employed to capture the interplay of acts
generating objects. A person's behavior is viewed as organized
to the extent that it has meaning, the meaning being generated
by the culturally defined objects with which a person interacts.
More specifically, this focus on the interactional field
leads us to define the organization of behavior as the observ-
able effect of information processing (Bruner, et al., 1971;
Miller, 1969). This can be measured empirically by the
qualitative and quantitative coding of the act, and this was
done in two ways: through an instrumentation termed the
Direct Object Count (DOC) and by classifying the acts
themselves.
INSTRUMENTATION
As a method of coding and measuring the amount of
information in the act, the Direct Object Count was developed
by Thomas McPartland and first introduced by Dobrofsky (1971)
and Kweskin (1971). The method consisted of counting every
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object indicated or referred to in each complete act of a
subject during a sample period, usually about 15 minutes.
This coding method is based on the logical assumption that
when children incorporate a growing number of objects or
attributes of objects in their acts, their behavior is
correspondingly more organized. This incorporation involves
the totality of the immediate physical and social environment.
Thus, the child constitutes the effective field of his action
by whatever he attends to, in whatever way he attends to it.
One example should help to clarify the counting procedure
where more complex acts are involved. The following is a
partial recording of a five year old subject's act which
ended up as an eighty four object act:
Child goes to bench, takes paste from box, asks
!?a ' "Where's the paper?" (boy points to paper);
aes paper, circle pattern, oval pattern, scissors,
and brush; sets them on floor; gets up quickly and
runs to encil box, takes pencil and returns; places
pattern on paper, with pencil draws around pattern
. . . takes lid off paste jar, puts paste on brush,
brushes paste on back of paper, sticks oval paper
to background paper . .
The above act is one containing a number of sequences or
"nodes," all of which make up one large act. The final object-
count is an accurate measure of the act's complexity because
it represents the continuous, unbroken and uninterrupted
action in which all of the nodes are related to the end of the
act. A less complex version of the above act would be the
example of a child, who, after the second or third sequence,
joins a group of children playing with blocks. His lower
object-count could be taken as an accurate direct measure of
the lesser complexity of his act.
In the research of Dobrofsky and Kweskin and later by
Endress (1972), the DOC had been shown to discriminate between
the levels of behavioral organization of children up to
two years and of mentally retarded children. It was found
that the ability to implicate objects in acts grows with the
development of syntactical speech and to some extent with
age.
The second coding method involved the classification of
acts. The major classification entails the distinction
between what we term first-order and second-order acts. In
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setting forth this classification, we were guided by Vygotsky's
(1962: 116) observation that it is the lack of distance from
immediate experience which is the factor which accounts for
the peculiarities of child thought. Thus, a first-order act
is defined as one in which the child organizes his behavior by
acting with direct reference to objects. That is, the
concrete objects act as stimuli which evoke responses that
refer directly to the objects. A second-order act, on the
other hand, is by definition an act containing indirect
reference to objects. It should be clear that the symbol,
the heart of symbolic interactionism, is the mechanism for
indirect reference. The facility to act with indirect
reference to objects means that the child supplies an organi-
zation which the objects alone do not have. For example, the
child building a tower out of blocks is in charge of the blocks
and, therefore, farther removed from immediate experience than
another child who simply stacks the blocks with no indication
of some larger end-in-view. This notion of first and second-
order acts was influenced by Blumer's (1969: 9) distinction
between non-symbolic and symbolic acts.
Six categories of second-order acts were devised, each
characterized by some form of indirect reference to objects:
1) acts containing non-verbal indirect reference, 2) acts
containing verbal indirect reference, 3) acts organized by
use of verbal indirect reference, 4) acts in which intent is
signalled verbally, 5) joint acts, and 6) acts of role-play.
The second-order acts are defined as follows:
Non-verbal indirect reference is defined as that
feature of an act whereby the child leaves the
situation in which he is working at an act and
moves to a different place or a different person
to get an object which is used to facilitate the
ongoing act. e.g., Tina leaves work table, walks
to bench to retrieve jar of paste; returns to table
and applies paste to back of paper.
An act containing verbal indirect reference is
defined as an act in which the objects or attri-
butes of objects verbally referred to are not
immediately present in the act. Verbal here
means syntactical utterance (more than one
English word in a recognizable English sentence).
e.g., Peering into an empty jar, Antoine says,
"That's where they put flies."
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An act organized by verbal indirect reference is
an act containing a syntactical utterance which
refers to the motor act which follows. e.g.,
Tony blurts out while sitting at table, "We gonna
eat."
An act in which intent is signalled verbally is an
act preceded by a syntactical utterance which
consists of a self-reference followed by a statement
of intent to perform the act. e.g., After asserting,
"I'm making a tower," Jackie begins to stack blocks.
A joint act is an interdependent act in which the
child's behavior complements or is complemented by
another's behavior. e.g., Joey lifts cup toward
Jane who makes pouring motion with coffee pot.
An act of role-play is defined as an act in which
an identifiable pattern of role behavior can be
observed, and although one or more objects
associated with the role behavior are actually not
present, the child behaves as if they are present.
e.g., Lisa "feeds" doll with empty nursing bottle.
Data collection for the research involved the direct
observation and written recordig of each child's acts during
a fifteen-minute sample period. Such "passive participant
observation," (Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955) although time-
consuming and costly, satisfies Blumer's (1969: 46) preferences
for the kind of investigation which "preserves the natural,
ongoing character of the empirical world."
We think it also achieves what Blumer (1969: 177) terms
the intimate relation between the scientific concept and
empirical fact. This kind of relationship, in which a
measurement procedure is logically derived from the theory
1It was not possible to obtain a formal, quantitative
measure of reliability in coding the observed acts. However,
during the trial period of observer training and during the
research observations, the observer had the opportunity to
periodically check his coding with an outside consultant and
judge. Dr. Thomas McPartland, who was largely instrumental
in developing or proposing most of the coding procedures,
served as consultant and judge.
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being tested, meets the criteria for construct validity
(Selltiz, 1959).
RESULTS
Direct Object Count. As a quantitative, objective
measure, the Direct Object Count (DOC) proved productive. The
DOC was found to discriminate between behavioral acts of
children from 33 to 63 months of age. Cross-sectional analysis
indicated that increases in the organization of behavior, as
measured by the DOC, occurred concomitantly with increases in
age. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between
age and the DOC in each of the three programs are as follows:
for Montessori children, .61; for Parent-Child, .64, and for
Day Care, .74. Further analysis showed that this relationship
was not confounded by length of time in the program.
An attempt was also made to detect program effects as
measured by the DOC. It was expected that, since the
Montessori program placed greater stress upon exposure to
teacher instruction and instructional objects than did the
Parent-Child and Day Care programs, increases in the organiza-
tion of behavior would be greater for MC than for PCC and DC
children. The findings tended to bear out that expectation.
While controlling for the effect of age by matching subjects
across programs, the Montessori children had significantly
higher object-counts than children in the other two centers
during the early observation periods. 2
Interestingly, it was found that the assumption of the
compensatory education programs was accurate, namely, that
children from low-income, low-education families would enter
the programs at a disadvantage relative to children from high-
income, high-education families. The MC children entered
their program with significantly higher object-counts and
simply maintained their advantage through the duration of the
program. However, for the PCC subjects, the differences
toward the middle (p = .27) and end (p = .09) of the program
year were no longer statistically significant. The DC
children, on the other hand, did not improve significantly
in relation to the ,!C children, although they did improve
2Analysis of 26 matched subjects at Time 2 with the
Friedman two-way analysis of variance resulted in x2r=10.23
and p = .01.
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sufficiently to demonstrate a non-significant difference in
relation to the PCC children. 3 The most extreme difference
was that between the MC and DC subjects at time 2; in Table
1., that comparison is displayed along with time 3 data.
TABLE 1. DIFFERENCES ON DOC BETWEEN MATCHED PAIRS
OF MC AND DC SUBJECTS AT TIMES 2 AND 3
Signsd Time 2 M C Time 3
+b 26 14
0 2 0
- 5 (p = .0002) 5 (p = .032)
asign Test
bMC is the point of comparison; thus, the values for the
DC subjects are obtained by applying the opposite sign to the
tabled values.
The above findings present an interesting challenge to
interactionist theory in trying to account for the observed
differences between children in the three programs. Since
there were initial differences, race and social class remain
plausible, competing explanations. However, the fact that the
differences did not remain constant over the brief span of
six or even three months suggests that race and class are not
the major bases for explaining the differences.
We would suggest that the most obvious explanation
involves the very process of interaction which links the chil-
dren to the physical and social objects within each program.
Because there were differences between the programs in the
degree to which they stressed instruction and instructional
objects as opposed to play and play objects, these differences
appeared to elicit differences in behavior organization. The
Parent-Child subjects increased their object-counts midway
through the program year because of improvements in the level
of instruction and the increased availability of instructional
objects. While the Day Care Center made some such improvements,
it still preserved the high level of play activity, high
emphasis on sociability, and heavy expression of affect.
3The Sign Test for differences between PCC and DC: at
Time 2 with N = 20, p = .012; at Time 3 with N = 17, p = .50.
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It should be emphasized that the above between-grouos
analysis was not longitudinal, since it proved difficult to
observe the same matched nairs at each oint in time. However,
it was possible to obtain some longitudinal data within each
educational program, although most of the N's were small.
Table 2. shows whether the object-counts of subjects in each
center increased (+) or decreased (-) over observation
periods.
TABLE 2. CHANGES IN THE DOC OVER THREE
OBSERVATION PERIODS IN EACH
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM
Observation Period
Center Signa Time 1-2 Time 1-3 Time 2-3
MC + 7 5 19
0 1 1 2
- 4 (p = .27) 2 (p = .23) 15 (p= .31)
PCC + 6 8 6
0 0 1 1
- 6 (p = .61) 5 (p = .29) 7 (p = .50)
DC + 18
0 7
11 (p = .13)
aSign Test
bDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
Table 2. is a longitudinal presentation of the DOC over
time by type of center. The key comparisons are those between
Time 1 and Time 3 for MC and PCC and between Time 2 and Time 3
for DC. The data indicates a clear trend for the DOC to
increase in all three centers. One has to be cautious about
the findings in that the changes over time are not statistically
significant; the non-significance of the results being primarily
a function of the small number of cases in each center
available for longitudinal analysis. The trend in this data
does, however, support the contention that these programs can
effectively increase the DOC. Age alone could not account for
the sharp increase in the DOC in all centers in that only
six months elapsed between the Time 1 and Time 3 measures.
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Second-Order Acts. In our research, the second-order act
did not evidence the same discriminatory power as the Direct
Object Count. It was discovered that children performed
second-order acts at all age levels and that the frequency of
such acts did not increase with age. Only two of the six
second-order acts varied significantly with age. However, we
discovered that the second-order act may have some utility if
viewed as a qualitative measure.
Viewed thusly, this approach of classifying acts resulted
in two qualitative findings which we could not have gotten
from the more objective DOC. Younger children were found
significantly less likely (p = .02) to signal their intent
verbally than older children, with most of the variance
accounted for by the Montessori children. This finding would
lead us to conclude that in speech communities like the
Montessori Center, the tendency to signal intent verbally
comes later rather than earlier. The other finding was that
older children were significantly less likely (p = .004) to
perform an act of role-play than younger children. This adds
support to Mead's contention that the child progresses from
a "play" stage to a "game" stage. Through the pretending
involved in role-playing, the child mimics others until he
is able to perform without mimicking.
The second-order categories were also useful in detecting
differences in the behavior of children both within and between
the three programs. Coding and observing the children's acts
told us something about how the child's preschool world was
organized. It goes beyond a simple objective count of objects
and attempts to capture some of the qualities of the act. While
not as clear-cut in its interpretation as the DOC, it provides
some of the "richness" of everyday life. In this case, the
data suggests something about not only how the children
organized their behavior, but also about the ways in which the
programs themselves were organized.
Table 3., represents in summary form the changes within
each center over the three- and six-month observation periods
on performance of the second-order acts. It should be clarified
that in the "before-after" analysis, subjects were only included
who could be observed at both time periods, so the N's range
from 8 to 36.
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TABLE 3. CHANGES IT: PEPFOR"!MCE OF SECOND-ORDFR
ACTS ACROSS OBSERVATION; PERIODS.
Observation Perioda
Act Center Time 1-2 Tire 1-3 Time 2-3
Non-Verbal MC Decrease* Increase Increase*
Indirect Reference PCC Increase No Change Decrease
DC b Increase
Verbal MC Decrease Increase Increase
Indirect Reference PCC Decrease Increase Increase
DC Decrease
Organized by MC Increase Increase Increase
Verbal Indirect PCC Decrease Increase* Increase*
Reference DC Increase
Signals Intent MC Increase Increase Increase
Verbally PCC Decrease No Change Increase
DC Increase
Joint Act MC Decrease Decrease Increase
PCC Increase Increase* Increase*
DC Increase
Role-Play MC Decrease Increase No Change
PCC Decrease* Increase Increase*
DC Decrease
Change is significant beyong .05 level.
aNs are as follows: Time 1-2: MC = 12, PCC = 12;
Time 2-3: MC = 36, PCC = 27, DC = 36.
bDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
In the Montessori Center, children tended to show a con-
sistently varied repertoire of acts through the duration of the
program. On only one category was there significant change
toward the end of the program year, namely, in performance of
acts with non-verbal indirect reference (p = .025). It seems
noteworthy that increases in this non-verbal second-order
behavior did not coincide with any decrease in the amount of
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verbal indirect reference and it clearly appeared to result from
the concerted effort by the teacher and assistants to gradually
encourage completion of assigned tasks and experimentation with
instructional objects. Furthermore, the consistently minimal
amount of expressed affect and role-play along with a moderate
amount of joint acts, in combination with the above findinag,
suggests a pattern of predominantly task-oriented behavior.
The DC children showed a pattern of activities somewhat
different from that of the MC children, as the acts of the
former were not as varied, especially in the program's
beginning. By the end of the program year, however, there was
a significant increase in the kinds of second-order acts per-
formed (p = .005). Nevertheless, the DC children demonstrated
consistently high amounts of certain acts across time periods -
acts with verbal indirect reference, acts organized by verbal
indirect reference, joint acts, and acts expressing affect.
The tendency to signal intent verbally was minimal, and non-
verbal indirect reference was almost non-existent. This
pattern of activity seemed to follow logically from proarari
conditions which emphasized sociability, play, vocabulary, and
group-centered and age-segregated instruction.
Of the three educational programs, the Parent-Child
Center showed the greatest amount of change. By the last
part of the program, the children showed significant increases
in the number and kinds of second-order acts (p = .02 and
.005), acts organized by verbal indirect reference (p = .008),
joint acts (p = .04), and acts of role-play (p = .05). While
these children were more likely to be selected for the program
because of their need for compensatory education than Day Care
children, we cannot say with any certainty that the dramatic
change was evidence of the children's initial level of need.
In reality, the program itself was in somewhat of a "disadvan-
taged" state initially and only in the last three months
underwent a reorganization resulting in more space, more
staffing, and more play and instructional objects.
In actuality, over time the activities of the PCC children
came to resemble those of the DC children. As in the case of
the latter, the former's acts became more varied, more verbal,
4A non-second-order category termed expression of affect
was included to note possible differences in the overt expression
of emotions such as anger, joy or irritation.
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and more sociable, with few acts of non-verbal indirect
reference and the sicxnalling of intention verbally. The
program conditions were sufficiently similar to those of the
Day Care Center to account for this pattern of behavioral
organization.
Difference within the separate programs obviously give
rise to differences between the programs. The brief descrip-
tion of the latter should sharpen our appreciation of the
discrimrinatory potential of the second-order acts as qualitative
categories. Table 4. gives a crude summary of the children's
performance of second-order acts in each of the three time
periods.
First of all, midway through the school year, the MC
children were performing significantly more second-order acts
than PCC children (p = .05) and more kinds of second-order
acts than DC and PCC children (p = .025 and .05). Also, the
MC children were significantly more likely to perform an act of
non-verbal indirect reference and to signal their intent
verbally than were children in the other centers (p = .001).
By the end of the program year, there were no longer
differences in the number or variety of second-order acts.
However, DC and PCC children had not erased the differences
in performance of non-verbal indirect reference and in the
signalling of intent verbally. These two types of acts clearly
appeared to follow from the Montessori program's emphasis on
individually accountable behavior reinforced by the pattern in
which children consistently reported to an adult on completion
of assigned tasks. We do not know whether the greater
expression of the pronoun "we" rather than "I" among the DC
and PCC children is an indication of a "restricted" language
code (Bernstein, 1969) with its source in the social structure
of the intimate community of others. We do know, however,
that there was no observable structural condition such as was
present in the Montessori program which could encourage the
children to verbally signal their individual intentions.
Finally, in keeping with its emphasis on play and socia-
bility, at midway through the program the DC children were
5The data in Table 4. is cross-sectional and not intended
to be interpreted as longitudinal.
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF SECOND-ORDER ACTS PERFORMED
AT THREE OBSERVATION PERIODS.
Observation Perioda
Act Center Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Non-Verbal
Indirect Reference
Verbal
Indirect Reference
Organized by
Verbal Indirect
Reference
Signals
Intent Verbally
Joint Act
Highb
Moderate
c
High
High
MC
PCC
DC
MC
PCC
DC
MC
PCC
DC
Role-Play
Moderate
Moderate
Low
High
High
High
Moderate High
Low Low
High
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
Moderate High
Low Moderate
High
Low Low
Moderate Low
Moderate
aN's are as follows:
MC = 45, PCC = 27, DC = 4
DC = 36.
Time 1: MC = 12, PCC = 12; Time 2:
5; Time 3: MC = 36, PCC = 18,
bTable values are defined as follows: High - score is
above the median for sample group; Moderate - score is between
the first quartile and the median; Low - score is at or below
the first quartile.
cDay Care subjects were not observed at Time 1.
significantly more likely than both MC and PCC groups to perform
a joint act (p = .01), an act of role-play (p = .05), and to
express affect (p = .001). Toward the end of the proaram, the
DC group no longer surpassed the PCC qroup in performance of
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High
Moderate
Low
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
Moderate
Moderate
High
High
High
Low
High
Low
joint acts and acts or role-play, although they continued to
significantly out-perform both groups in the expression of
affect (p = .01) and the MC group in joint acts (u = .025).
Interestingly, the Parent-Child children had by then come to
out-perform the other two groups in acts of role-play, having
become accustomed to new surroundings, new classmates, and a
larger assortment of familiar objects.
CONCLUSIONS
Methodological. In keeping with a symbolic interactionist
orientation, the research findings tend to demonstrate, on the
one hand, the power of objective events to affect the behavior
of preschool children, and on the other, the power of the
children themselves to organize their own behavior, thereby
giving meaning to it. In this orientation, we have not lost
sight of either of the key issues in the social psychology
of human action, the person acting on his physical and social
environment and being influenced by the objective conditions
in his environment. Thus, we would conclude with Blumer
(1969: 11) that to understand our preschool subjects, we had
"to identify their world of objects," and with Mead (1970: 70),
we had to identify the "programs of action" under which the
children would generate the objects of their own action. And
finally, we would agree with Kuhn that one can measure such
phenomena.
The methodology employed here has been pragmatic and
straightforward. We believe the concepts have "logically clear
and meaningful referents," and that the operational tools are
sufficiently naturalistic to allow for direct interpretations
and programmatic remedies (Blumer, 1969). In a study of child
development, this methodological orientation allows us to
treat the middle ground between the mentalistic denotation
of the concept intelligence and the other extreme of environ-
mental determinism. In this endeavor, we are guided by Mead's
(1970: 39) injunction, "to state the intelligence of the
individual in terms which will enable us to see how that
intelligence is exercised, and how it may be improved."
Our measures of cognitive development, the Direct Object
Count and the second-order acts placed us in direct touch with
the child's physical and social world. We found that the DOC
correlated highly with age (33 months to 63 months) yet also
varied with type of preschool program. The second-order acts,
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as indicators of certain qualities inherent within the act,
provided us with a description of how children organized their
behavior within the three educational centers.
Program. In attempting to assess the differential effects
of three types of preschool programs, it was discovered that the
programs did make a difference and that the differences were
greatest for the black, low-income children attending the
Parent-Child and Day Care Centers. In spite of initial
differences, three major trends were noted over the brief
spans of three and six months: (1) the behavior of all
three groups became more organized; (2) the groups became
developmentally more alike; and (3) certain differences between
groups persisted, coinciding with program differences.
While social class or other background factors could have
accounted for the initial differences between groups, clearly
their possible effects are not linear and constant, since they
diminished over time. To the contrary, the above trends
suggest that once the child enters the confines of the
preschool setting, the school rather than the home appears to
make the major difference in his cognitive development.
From another perspective, the finding of initial differences
does not allow programmers in compensatory education to rest on
the assumption that "disadvantaged" children require special
treatment to compensate for their developmental deficits.
True, it has been found that low-income persons learn best by
doing; that is, through motor expression (Riessman, 1964).
However, we saw no evidence that the low-income children in
our study required special treatment. In fact, children in
all three centers learned by doing. This is not surprising;
it simply follows logically from the age-related learning needs
of these children.
However, in observing program conditions, our impression
was that the PCC and DC programmers tried so hard to overcome
the children's presumed learning deficits that they unwittingly
underestimated the real capabilities of their low-income
subjects. An overemphasis on motor expression through play and
group sociability as well as a too generalized stress on
vocabulary had the effect of not fully challenging the
children's capability for behavior which is task-centered and
personally and syntactically accountable. Thus, the differences
which persisted between the MC, PCC and DC children on the DOC
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and certain second-order acts relate directly to program
capability rather than to differences in learning capability
between the groups.
The MC children persisted in showing higher object-
counts and a pattern of second-order acts which included high
amounts of non-verbal indirect reference and signalling of
intent verbally. This pattern of behavior related directly
to program conditions which encouraged individual, task-
centered effort and personal accountability through individual
and group instruction and heavy use of instructional objects.
Children in the MC program, no less than children in the PCC
and DC programs, simply demonstrated the capability of adapting
effectively to the kind of preschool program presented to
them.
We do not suggest that Montessori education is superior to
that of a Parent-Child or Day Care Center. We simply suggest
that the developmental outcomes obtained by the Montessori
program in our study can be achieved in other preschool
programs to the extent that programmers value them. They can
be achieved by simply varying the conditions which relate to
what we called the Direct Object Count and second-order acts.
Because the second-order acts have an internal logic which
makes them naturalistic and situation-based, changes in the ts
relate to changes in the social situations, that is, in the
program conditions. If programmers in the Parent-Child and
Day Care Centers were to choose outcomes similar to those
of the Montessori Class, we believe that the persistent
differences found between children in the three centers
could be eliminated entirely by the following changes in
program conditions: (1) more exposure to a variety of
instructional objects; (2) less emphasis on group-centeredness
with consequently more emphasis on individual performance;
(3) more emphasis on syntactical accountability; and (4)
provision of more social objects through mixing children of
different ages and through more adult direction and assistance.
These recommendations are straightforward suggestions for
enlivening the interactional field of the child. Out of the
resulting increase in program organization should come an
increase in the child's own behavioral organization. In
Meadian fashion Asbell (1972: 156) has captured this conclusion
as he suggests:
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It may be better to forget about intelligence and
find out what makes each child excercise his inborn
eagerness to learn, feed his individual style of
curiosity, and then watch his intelligence, by
almost any measure, expand.
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